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Abstract 
This paper discusses the case for expanding active labor market policy in recession. We 
find that there is reasonable case for relying more heavily on certain kinds of programs. 
The argument is tied to the varying size of the lock-in effect in boom and recession. If 
programs with relatively large lock-in effects should ever be used, they should be used 
in a downturn. The reason is simply that the cost of forgoing search time is lower in 
recession. We also provide new evidence on the relative effectiveness of different kinds 
of programs over the business cycle. In particular we compare an on-the-job training 
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1  Introduction 
Active labor market policies (ALMPs) have become an integral part of the tool kit for 
combating unemployment. In 2008, total expenditures on labor market policies amoun-
ted to 2.1 percent of GDP in the average OECD country, and 42 percent of the total was 
devoted to active measures. During 1985–2008 the share of ALMP in total expenditures 
increased substantially in continental Europe and the UK, stayed constant (and high) in 
the Nordic countries and was reduced substantially in  the  US.  As a result of these 
trends, the spending patterns across the OECD countries have become more similar.  
Expenditures on ALMPs typically vary with the business cycle, as do any kind of 
expenditure relating to unemployment. But expenditures on ALMPs relative to overall 
unemployment  expenditures  are  in  fact  pro-cyclical:  the  share  devoted  to  ALMPs 




Figure 1: Share of expenditure devoted to ALMP over the business cycle 
                                                
1 The structure of ALMP expenditure is more difficult to compare across countries for many reasons: all kinds of 
programs are not available in every country and programs with the same names may have different contents, just to 
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The analysis in this paper provides a discussion of two related questions. First, is 
there any good reason to vary the spending on ALMP over the cycle? Second, should 
different programs be relied on more heavily in different phases of the cycle? Or, to 
bundle both questions into one: What active labor market policy works in a recession? 
This is essentially an empirical question. However, the evidence on this important 
question  is  extremely  scant.  So  rather  than  providing  concrete  policy  advice  based 
firmly on the evidence, we try to identify the crucial policy considerations and discuss 
to what extent the general evidence on the efficacy of ALMPs apply to the question at 
hand.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by illustrating how we think 
about ALMP and introducing some concepts that we use later on. Section 3 discusses 
the positive question of why we might expect ALMP to have different effects across the 
business cycle. In Section 4 we raise the normative question of why it might be optimal 
to adjust ALMPs in response to the business cycle and whether certain kinds of ALMPs 
should be preferable over others. The question of whether the efficacy of a given ALMP 
varies with the business cycle constitutes a very difficult evaluation problem. In Section 
5 we make this evaluation problem more precise.  
Remaining sections are devoted to the evidence. We begin by analyzing the nature of 
a  recession  in  Section  6.  Among  other  things,  we  characterize  the  extent  to  which 
recessions should be thought of as cyclical or structural shocks and describe the changes 
of the composition of individuals who lost their jobs in different states of the labor 
market. We also examine if the composition of participants in ALMP changes with the 
business cycle. Section 7 turns to the evaluation evidence: We present the evidence that 
directly relates to the question at hand and discuss what we can infer from other types of 
evidence.  
Since the evidence which is directly relevant is so scant, we devote section 8 to an 
empirical example. Specifically, we provide evidence on the relative efficacy in boom 
and recession of two Swedish labor market programs that have both been used fairly 
extensively:  an  on-the-job  training  scheme  (arbetspraktik)  and  vocational  training 
programs (arbetsmarknadsutbildning). To identify the effects of the cycle we use the 
variation in unemployment rates within local labor markets over time. This enables us  
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to abstract from institutional changes affecting both programs, since they are common 
across regions. This is an improvement relative to the previous literature. Section 9 
concludes.  
Before turning to the analysis let us mention some limitations. We focus solely on an 
efficiency argument for expanding (various forms of) ALMPs in a recession. To be 
more precise, we only discuss whether certain kinds of policies are more beneficial in a 
recession because they improve the earnings potential of the participating individuals. 
Thus, we do not discuss purely distributional arguments for using ALMPs (if one is 
concerned  with  distributional  issues  it  seems  more  efficient  to  use  targeted  cash 
transfers instead). Neither do we discuss arguments relating to the possibility that firms 
may shed too much labor in a recession. Nor do we discuss general equilibrium effects 
of ALMPs. Yet another omission is that we do not consider “threat effects” or other pre-
program effects. Such effects are likely to be less important in recessions, which could 
motivate  a  down-sizing  of  programs  in  recessions.  Finally,  we  ignore  the  fact  that 
ALMPs may improve the targeting of UI by making UI benefit receipt conditional on 
passing the work test implied by program participation. The latter issue is discussed in 
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006). The upshot of their analysis is that it is better to use 
a monitoring scheme or a time-limit on UI benefit rather than a time-consuming labor 
market program to improve the targeting of UI.  
A final remark is that all our own data analysis is based on Swedish data. We do not 
expect  that  this  has  any  implications  for  the  generality  of  the  analysis.  After  all, 
practically all OECD countries make extensive use of ALMPs today.  
2  Preliminaries 
Before probing deeper into analysis it is useful to make clear what we mean by active 
labor market policies and to define some concepts that we will use later on. 
Unemployment is typically an eligibility condition for ALMP. While this is not true 
everywhere, it is generally the case that the participants should be searching for a job in 
order to take part in an active measure.   
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We think it is useful to distinguish policies by the different time investments they 
require on the part of workers. Those requiring a non-negligible time investment we 
will refer to as “programs”. Other policies – for instance job search assistance (JSA) and 
counseling and monitoring – generally require substantially smaller amounts of time 
investment. 
Programs  are  analogous  to  schooling.  They  are  investments  in  current  time  and 
money for a future increase in earnings. The clearest analogy, of course, pertains to 
labor market training. But we would also like to think of subsidized employment in this 
way; we think of subsidized employment as investment in on-the-job training which 
may increase the chances of the participants on the regular (unsubsidized) market.  
While pursuing an investment activity you are forgoing something. In this case you 
are forgoing time that could have been used to search for a regular job, and thereby 
increasing the probability of finding one.  
The effects of treatment are fundamentally different while taking part in the program 
and after program completion. Figure 2 graphs two examples of hypothetical treatment 
effects for a given set of individuals.   
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Figure 2: Two hypothetical profiles of treatment effects 
 
The two programs differ in terms of intensity. The intensive program has a planned 
duration of 9 months while the less intensive one is planned to last for 3 months. The 
intensity of the program is also reflected in the fact that the intensive one is assumed to 
have bigger "lock-in" effects than the less intensive one. After program completion, the 
"post-program" effects are uniformly larger than for the less intensive one.  
The first stage of the evaluation is to determine whether the sequence of treatment 
effects observed after program entry is positive. In a second stage of the analysis, one 
would like to compare the net benefit to other costs of running the program -- this cost-
benefit analysis is rarely done, however. 
We  provide  the  illustration  in  Figure  2  to  make  clear  how  we  think  one  should 
estimate the treatment effects. Having said this one should note that this is not how it is 
always done in the literature. Some researchers only examine the post-program effects, 
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answers  an  ill-posed  question  (it  would  be  like  calculating  the  return  to  schooling, 
ignoring the investment period). 
Another reason for showing the example in  Figure 2  is that we  want to use the 
terminology we have introduced later on. Therefore, we will use lock-in effects to refer 
to the treatment effects while taking part in the program, and post-program effects to 
refer to the treatment effects after program completion.  
3  Why would treatment effects vary with the cycle? 
The clearest argument for why the treatment effects vary with the business cycle relates 
to the lock-in effects. The lock-in effect should be smaller in a downturn. Intuitively, it 
is easy to see that if program participants do not search at all, then a downturn only 
affects the effect of the alternative to treatment (i.e., job search) and thus the lock-in 
effect is reduced in a recession. More generally, the lock-in effect is smaller in recession 
if individual search effort and the state of the labor market have complementary effects 
on the probability of finding a job.
2  
It is more difficult to  have  a definitive  prior regarding  the post-program effects. 
Nevertheless, an intuitive argument is based on “scarring” (i.e. the fact that exposure to 
unemployment at the time of labor market entry has negative consequences for future 
earnings; e.g. Ellwood 1982). For those who do not enter the program in a recession, the 
bad  state  of  the  labor market  will  influence  their earnings  prospects  with  certainty. 
Those who enter a program, however, enter the labor market at some future time point. 
Chances are that the economy has turned for the better, in which case their employment 
prospects will not be hurt as much as for those who did not enter treatment. 
Other arguments for why average treatment effects vary with the cycle are related to 
heterogeneous  effects.  Such  treatment  heterogeneity  may  provide  an  efficiency 
argument for an expansion of program activity in a recession. Therefore we relegate a 
discussion of these arguments to the next section. 
                                                
2 Complementarity simply means that the job offer arrival rate is increasing in search effort holding the business 
cycle constant. Conversely, a given search effort produces more job offers in a booming labor market than in a 
depressed labor market.   
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4  Why should ALMPs vary with the cycle? 
Positive treatment effects are in themselves no argument for subsidizing ALMP – some 
market failure is required. If the unemployed face credit constraints, it is optimal to 
provide public insurance. If unemployment implies skill loss, an optimal policy package 
will  typically  involve  ALMP;  see  Wunsch  (2010).  Thus,  the  combination  of  credit 
constraints and skill loss provides an efficiency argument for having ALMPs in general. 
The questions we raise here is  if there  is a case  for expanding program activity  in 
general during recession and whether certain kinds of policies are more beneficial than 
others. 
4.1  The general case 
In a labor market where it is optimal to provide public insurance, individual search 
decisions are distorted. In particular, individual search effort is too low from society’s 
point of  view (see Fredriksson and  Holmlund  2001).  The  reason is  that there is  an 
“externality” working through the public budget. If everyone would search a bit more, 
employment  would  increase;  with  higher  employment,  taxes  can  be  lowered  which 
represents a gain for everyone. This general equilibrium effect is not taken into account 
by the individual agent, and hence represents an externality.  
The marginal cost to society of this distortion is likely higher in a booming labor 
market. The complementary effects of search effort and the state of the labor market on 
the probability of finding a job are key to this result. If this is the case, then a reduction 
of search intensity by a given amount decreases employment more in boom than in 
recession. 
Andersen and Svarer (2009) have recently made this point in relation to the question 
of whether unemployment benefits should be made more generous in a recession. Their 
answer is “yes” (provided that the balanced budget requirement applies across states of 
nature), and the reason is precisely the one given above.  
As argued earlier, the typical active labor market program involves an investment 
activity which is completely analogous to investment in education. Since participation 
in  such  programs  is  a  time-consuming  activity,  programs  distort  the  incentives  to 
search, which is also a time-consuming activity (there is ample evidence that there are  
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these so-called lock-in effects associated with program participation; see, e.g. van Ours 
2004, and evidence on search behavior of program participants in Ackum Agell 1996 or 
Regnér and Wadensjö 1999). The costs of such distortions are smaller in a recession, 
which provides one rationale for increasing program activity during a recession.  
A  crucial  issue  is  to  what  extent  recessions  involve  structural  shocks,  rendering 
worker skills obsolete. If the prevalence of such structural shocks is greater in recession 
than in boom this is another rationale for increasing program activity during a recession, 
since programs, at least to some extent, offer retraining to workers.  
4.2  Relative efficiency of different kinds of programs 
Active labor market policy comprises many forms of activities, not just “programs”. 
Some policies do not involve a time investment at all. Moreover, different programs 
distort search incentives to a varying degree. Therefore intuition suggests that different 
kinds of ALMPs should be used more extensively in a downturn.  
Job search assistance and monitoring of search behavior are two examples of policies 
that involve marginal investments in time. Job search assistance presumably raises the 
efficiency of search and monitoring increases the individual return to search for each 
unit of time that the individual searches for a job. Intuition would suggest that these 
kinds of ALMPs should be used more extensively in a boom than in a recession.  
For the programs involving different extents of time investments, there is arguably a 
case for using the most intensive programs in a recession. Thus, one would think that 
training programs which have larger lock-in effects are relatively more efficient in a 
downturn than programs that distort search incentives to a smaller extent. 
Another aspect of program heterogeneity involves the timing of ALMPs. A given 
program may have differential effects depending on when (in an unemployment spell) 
an individual enters. A couple of recent papers (Spinnewijn 2010; Wunsch 2010) have 
analyzed the issue of when the programs should be offered in an unemployment spell. It 
turns out that the answer depends on the nature of skill loss associated with job loss and 
unemployment. If job loss in itself involves substantial skill loss relative to the gradual 
skill loss occurring over the course of unemployment, for example if job loss renders 
job-specific skills obsolete, then it is better to target individuals early on in the spell.  
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One  crucial  question,  then,  is  whether  recessions  and  displacement  have  significant 
structural components. We discuss this question in Section 6. 
5  The evaluation problem 
Treatment effects are likely to vary across individuals, i.e. they are heterogeneous. This 
heterogeneity  presumably  applies  to  the  observable  as  well  as  the  unobservable 
dimension.  
An evaluation amounts to estimating actual and counterfactual outcomes for a given 
program and a given set of individuals who are eligible for a program. To examine  
whether the effects of ALMP vary with the business cycle one has to compare treatment 
effects over time. Such comparisons raise several issues: 
 
1.  Is it the same program?  
2.  Do eligibility or selection rules change? 
3.  Does the population of eligible individuals change over time? 
 
Regarding the first point, there may be changes in the fine details of the program 
even  though  the  name  of  the  intervention  stays  the  same.  Consider  occupational 
retraining, for instance. At various points in time the Public Employment Service (PES) 
may decide to offer retraining for different occupations depending on what it thinks is in 
high demand. Retraining for different occupations implies that there is variation both in 
the content of the program and presumably also the length of the program. Since both 
content and length are likely to affect the size of the treatment effect, the effect for the 
overall program -- occupational retraining -- is likely to vary even though the treatment 
effect for each individual occupation stays the same.  
The second point refers to the overall institutional rules that govern eligibility and 
selection.  For  instance,  at  one  point  in  time  a  given  program  may  cater  only  for 
unemployment  insurance  recipients,  at  other  points  in  time  the  entire  population 
registered at the PES office may be eligible for the program.   
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Institutional rules may also affect selection into the program – both self-selection on 
the  part  of  individuals  and  PES  selection  rules.  For  instance,  the  introduction  of 
performance criteria may cause PES officers to select different sets of individuals. One 
example of such performance criteria pertain to labor market training in Sweden. In 
1999, a  new  target  was  introduced:  3  months after  program  completion  at  least  70 
percent  of  the  participants  should  be  employed.  This  reform  arguably  changed  the 
incentives in favor of enrolling individuals with relatively good employment prospects 
with  and  without  the  program.  Another  example  (from  Sweden)  of  changes  in 
institutional  rules  pertains  to  the  relationship  between  UI  eligibility  and  program 
participation. Prior to 2001, program participation could be used to renew UI eligibility. 
During 2001 this opportunity was abolished. Such changes clearly affects incentives 
and, hence, the selection of individuals into the program.  
Even if the first and second points are not a concern, the population of eligibles (who 
are usually the unemployed) may change over time. This will affect the size of the 
average treatment effects if there is treatment heterogeneity. Treatment heterogeneity 
may  occur  in  the  observed  and  the  unobserved  dimension.  Figure  3  illustrates  a 
hypothetical example. It graphs the distribution of treatment effects for individuals who 
are unemployed in boom (dashed) and recession (solid). In Figure 3 we have assumed 
that in a recession the distribution is skewed towards those who have less to gain from 
the program.
3 This will give the impression of a smaller average treatment effect in 
recession, even though there is no variation in the effects of treatment at the individual 
level.  
 
                                                
3 This is consistent with the results in de Luna et al. (2008), where it was found that the treatment effect of training 
programs was decreasing in the level of education. In Section 6.2 we show that job losers in recession are drawn from 
the higher end of the wage distribution to a greater extent than job losers in boom, so that job losers in terms of 
observed and unobserved characteristics are drawn from a higher end of the distribution in depression than in boom.  
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Figure 3: The distribution of treatment effects in boom and recession 
 
To make matters even more difficult, there may be true (as opposed to spurious) 
duration dependence. With duration dependence unemployment has a causal effect on 
the unemployed individuals, so individuals become dissimilar in terms of job chances 
even though they may have been identical at the start of an unemployment spell. This 
complicates the evaluation problem if there is variation in the duration until program 
start. If treatment effects vary systematically with the timing of the intervention, the 
estimates may differ across the cycle even though there is really no difference.  
It is useful to ask the question: Would a series of experiments (or quasi-experiments) 
run at different points of the business cycle help us solve the evaluation problem? The 
short answer is that they would, if treatment effects are homogenous. But if there is 
treatment heterogeneity along the lines shown in Figure 3, we have to impose additional 
assumptions in order to solve the evaluation problem.  
To  see  this,  note  that  experiments  provide  internally  valid  estimates,  i.e.,  they 
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geneity, however, the results do not extend to another population, i.e., they are not 
externally  valid.  If  the  observed  and  unobserved  characteristics  of  the  eligible 
population vary with the state of the labor market, it is, in general, not possible to 
extrapolate the results from one time point to another.  
When would the variation in experimental estimates across the cycle have a causal 
interpretation? One would have to assume that treatment heterogeneity is only in the 
observed dimension. Under this assumption it is straightforward to adjust the estimates 
to take the variation in the distribution of observed characteristics across the state of the 
business cycle into account. But in the general case with treatment heterogeneity also in 
the  unobserved  dimension,  the  adjustment  in  terms  of  observed  characteristics  only 
provide  unbiased  estimates  under  a  "selection-on-observables"  assumption  (this 
assumption is sometimes referred to as the conditional independence assumption). This 
assumption effectively says that it is sufficient to control for observed characteristics to 
obtain unbiased estimates of the treatment effect.  
But if you are forced to make a selection-on-observables assumption to interpret the 
variation in the experimental estimates across the states of the business cycle, it seems 
equally  valid  (and  certainly  more  feasible)  to  base  the  entire  analysis  on  this 
assumption. In short, the value added of experiments is more limited than usual for the 
question at hand.  
Whether the selection on observables assumption is credible or not depends crucially 
on the richness of the information in the data used for the analysis. In recent years, 
administrative data sets containing, e.g., earnings and unemployment histories prior to 
program participation have become available. The availability of these data sets seems 
to have reduced the potential bias associated with the selection-on-observables assump-
tion. Indeed, a recent meta analysis by Card et al. (2009) suggests that the qualitative 
conclusions do not differ systematically between experimental and non-experimental 
approaches.  
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6  The anatomy of a recession 
Recessions  are  not  just  cyclical  shocks.  They  may  involve  a  significant  amount  of 
structural adjustment. If recessions involve more structural adjustment than the secular 
adjustment going on in a normal state of the labor market, then this has an effect on the 
optimal timing of ALMPs as argued above. 
A further issue is that different kinds of individuals are likely to lose their job in a 
recession than in other labor market states. This has (at least) two implications. First, if 
different  kinds  of  individuals  lose  their  jobs  in  a  recession,  this  substantially 
complicates the evaluation problem; the reason is that individuals differ in a number of 
respects, not only in the dimensions that we can typically observe in the data. Second, if 
there  are  heterogeneous  effects  of  ALMPs,  and  different  individuals  become 
unemployed in a recession, this has implications for the appropriate mix of ALMPs. 
In this section we use Swedish data do address these issues.  
6.1  To what extent do recessions involve structural shocks? 
We  have  used  the  OECD  composite  leading  indicator  to  identify  Swedish  business 
cycle peaks and troughs in the 1990s and 2000s. Looking at employment by industry, 
we  have  then  classified employment changes as cyclical  or structural depending on 
employment  changes  before  and  after  peaks  or  troughs.  We  consider  employment 
changes where employment either grows or contracts both before and after a turning 
point as employment in industries with structural change; see Groshen and Potter (2003) 
for  a  discussion  of  the  methods  used.  Using  this  methodology,  we  get  the  results 
presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Share (%) of total employment in sectors with structural change 
  Beginning of 1990s  
(Date (month) of peak/trough) 
Beginning of 2000s  













Note: Computations based on industry employment according the Labor Force Surveys (44 industries). 
The employment growth rate in each industry is measured relative to the national average growth rate.  
 
According to Table 1, the recession in the beginning of the 1990s involved more 
structural adjustment than the boom that preceded the recession. However, for the peaks 
and troughs occurring in the beginning of the 2000s, the opposite is true. On average, 
there thus seems to be about as much structural change in boom as in recession. At least 
there are no clear indications that structural change is concentrated to recessions.  
The main message of Table 1 is that it is difficult ex ante to determine from the 
business  cycle  position  whether  aggregate  job  losses  are  cyclical  or  structural.  The 
targeting of labor market programs should arguably be based on predicted individual 
risks instead. 
6.2  Who loses the job in a recession? 
Here the purpose is to characterize the skills of individuals who lose their jobs in a 
recession. We follow Juhn et al. (1991) in using wages as a summary measure of skills. 
We further decompose wages in a part explained by standard observed characteristics 
and an unexplained part.  
We have chosen the years 1992 to represent recession and 2005 for boom.
4 Hence, 
we identify individuals who were employed in 1991 and entered unemployment in 1992 
as individuals who lost their job in recession;
5 those who were employed in 2004 and 
                                                
4  One  may  discuss  the  choice  of  2005  to  represent  a  boom  year.  Nevertheless  we  think  this  choice  is  entirely 
innocuous. The important point is that the state of the business cycle is much better in 2005 than in 1992. According 
to the OECD composite leading indicator, a sustained business cycle expansion started in February 2005 which 
peaked in January 2008. For the analysis conducted here, 2006 or 2007 would perhaps have been more natural 
choices. The reason for choosing 2005 rather than 2006 or 2007 is that we characterize selection into labor market 
programs during boom and recession later on. For that analysis the change in government in 2006 constitutes a 
problem. Along with the change of government came a major restructuring of labor market policy. Therefore, we 
think it is better to use 2005 rather than the later years since otherwise the analysis may be contaminated by the 
“structural change” of ALMP.  
5 Data on unemployment entry come from the registers of the National Labor Market Board. It should be clear that 
individuals may have left employment for other reasons than having been laid off.  
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entered unemployment during 2005 lost their job in a boom. The question we are asking 
is whether the distributions of observed and unobserved skills are different over periods 
of boom and recession.  
Figure 4 plots the density of the job loss distribution by age and wage percentile for 
men, while Figure 5 presents an analogous plot for women. The solid lines relate the job 
loss to skills in recession, while the dashed lines pertain to boom. 
 
 
Figure 4: Job loss by wage percentile in boom and recession, men 
Notes: Calculations based on the unemployment register and wage register (strukturlönestatistiken). 
 
Job losers in recession are drawn from the higher end of the wage distribution to a 
greater extent than job losers in boom.
6 This pattern is most pronounced for older men. 
At lower ages, the picture is probably distorted by the fact that employment security 
legislation (last in – first out) interacts with age and the business cycle. The pattern that 
individuals at the higher end of the wage distribution are hit relatively harder is less 
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clear-cut for females. A possible explanation is that this reflects the larger employment 
share for females in the public sector, but due to data limitations, we have not been able 
to examine this thoroughly. 
 
 
Figure 5: Job loss by wage percentile in boom and recession, women 
Notes: Calculations based on the unemployment register and wage register (strukturlönestatistiken). 
 
When decomposing skills into observed and unobserved ones (not shown here), we 
note that much of the pattern for men is driven by the residual wage distribution, i.e., by 
unobserved  skills.
7  This  may  be  a  warning  against  too  much  reliance  on  estimated 
treatment  effects  using  models  where  identification  relies  on  selection  on  observed 
characteristics (such as, e.g., matching models) – characteristics of job losers change 
over the cycle and a non-negligible part of this is driven by unobserved characteristics.
8 
                                                
7 As the measure of observed skills we use predicted wages. Predicted wages are generated from a standard wage 
regression (run separately by gender), where log wages are explained by a fourth order polynomial in age, education, 
immigrant status, and years since migration. 
8 Perhaps one should not be overly alarmed. Using the typical register data set one can condition the analysis on 
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6.3  Program activity and the timing of interventions over the cycle 
Here we examine two questions: The first question is whether the characteristics of 
program participants change with the cycle; the second question is how the probability 
of entering a program varies by elapsed duration over the cycle. 
Regarding  the  first  question,  there  are  several  reasons  to  suspect  that  the 
characteristics of participants vary with the cycle. First of all, the skill composition of 
the eligible population changes in a recession, as demonstrated in the previous section. 
Second, if there are capacity constraints, recessions imply more competition for the 
available program slots. 
Skedinger (2010) examined if the skill composition of program participants varies 
with  the  cycle.  He  regressed,  inter  alia,  the  share  of  low-educated  in  programs  on 
unemployment, holding constant the share of low-educated among all individuals who 
are  at  risk  of  participating  in  a  program.
9  He  performed  the  analysis  on  monthly 
aggregate data including seasonal fixed effects in the analysis. Table 2 reproduces a 
sub-set of the results from Skedinger (2010). 
 
Table 2: Cyclical variation in the relative risk for low-educated of participating in ALMP  
Dependent variable: Share low-ed. in programs 
























Note: Monthly data 1996:01–2009:11. The regressions include seasonal FE:s and the share low-ed. 
among the eligible. T-ratios in parentheses. 
Source: Skedinger (2010). 
 
The first column of Table 2 illustrates that if the unemployment rate increases by 1 
percentage  point,  the  relative  risk  that  the  low-educated  (those  with  compulsory 
education or less) participates in a program decreases by –0.86 percentage points. When 
decomposing the overall effect into separate effects for different kind of programs, he 
found that this conclusion applied to labor market training (LMT; see col. 2) and job 
                                                
9 Since being recorded as unemployed is a pre-condition for partaking in a program, he controlled for the share of 
low-educated in the unemployment register.  
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search  assistance  (JSA;  see  col.  3)  but  not  for  subsidized  jobs  (col.  4).  Thus  the 
increasing number of high-educated in a recession to some extent crowds out the low-
educated. Lechner and Wunsch (2009) presented similar evidence for Germany.  
Skedinger (2010) conducted the same analysis for other characteristics. In short he 
found that youths are more likely to participate in a program during recession, that the 
participation rates of refugee immigrants are unrelated to the cycle, and that the relative 
risk of participating in a program decreases in a recession for individuals with: (i) a 
work impairment; and (ii) more than 2 years of unemployment.  
We have used micro data to revisit this issue. The advantage of using the micro data 
is that we can control for a (potentially large) number of characteristics simultaneously 
to isolate the unique contribution from each of the characteristics. The results of Cox 
regressions for hazards to all programs in boom and recession are shown in Table 3.
10  
   
                                                
10 The Cox regression models the flow (hazard rate) to programs as the product of a baseline hazard (     ) and a 
part that depends on characteristics (X):                 ,  where   denotes (a vector of) parameters to be estimated. 
An estimate of –0.06 on (say) immigrant status means that it is 6 percent less likely that an immigrant will enter a 
program  (per  unit  time)  relative  to  an  individual  born in  Sweden.  Note,  that  this  interpretation  is  based  on  the 
common practice of approximating relative changes with log changes. For sizable estimates, one should calculate the 
relative change as:      1.  
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Table 3: Determinants of ALMP participation in boom and recession 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  Recession (1992)  Boom (2005)  Difference: (1)-(2) 
       
Less than upper-secondary ed.  –0.11**  0.0051  –0.11** 
  (0.0053)  (0.0087)  (0.010) 
Immigrant  –0.061**  –0.0042  –0.057** 
  (0.0065)  (0.0082)  (0.010) 
Age 20–29  0.37**  0.13**  0.24** 
  (0.0051)  (0.0077)  (0.0092) 
Age 55+  –0.87**  –0.28**  –0.59** 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.020) 
Child under 10  –0.062**  0.046**  –0.11** 
  (0.0054)  (0.0084)  (0.010) 
Male  –0.072**  0.13**  –0.20** 
  (0.0046)  (0.0071)  (0.0084) 
Married  –0.033**  0.00086  –0.033** 
  (0.0059)  (0.0088)  (0.011) 
Outside big cities  0.40**  0.63**  –0.23** 
  (0.0066)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
       
Observations  572,716  522,714  1,095,430 
Notes: The results are generated using Cox regressions on data from the Swedish unemployment register. 
The analysis only includes individuals ages 20–60. Standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
 
By and large, the micro data convey the same message as the analysis in Skedinger 
(2010); the only substantive difference pertains to immigrants. On the one hand, the 
program hazards are significantly lower in recessions for: those with less than high 
school education, immigrants, and individuals aged 55–60 (relative to individuals aged 
30–44). On the other hand, the probability of entering a program is higher in recession 
for  young  persons.  To  take  an  example  of  the  magnitudes  involved,  the  estimates 
indicate that the program hazard  for those with less than upper-secondary education is 
(roughly) 11 percent lower in recession than in boom. 
In Figure 6 we present cumulative distribution functions (the CDFs) for time until 
program entry in boom  (2005) and  recession  (1992) for those who actually enter a 
program. Since the probability of having started the program before a certain time point 
is always higher in boom than in recession, the figure implies that individuals enter 
programs earlier in an unemployment spell in a good state of the business cycle. 
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Figure 6: CDF for time to program in a boom and in a recession 
Note: Calculations based on the Swedish unemployment register using individuals aged 20–60. 
7  The evidence 
To what extent do the effects of ALMP vary with the business cycle? As we have 
emphasized  repeatedly,  there  is  not  so  much  evidence  that  directly  pertains  to  the 
question we are interested in. Notice that the policy-relevant question relates to the state 
of the labor market at the time of program start. A few papers (Johansson 2001; Raaum 
et  al.  2002)  have  examined  whether  the  state  of  the  labor  market  at  the  time  of 
measuring outcomes matters. Although this might be an interesting factual, it is less 
clear why policy makers should be concerned with that question.  
7.1  Direct evidence on the efficacy of ALMPs over the cycle 
Lechner and Wunsch (2009) is the only paper that has directly addressed the question 
we are interested in. The lack of research on this issue is presumably not driven by lack 
of interest – the question is certainly highly policy relevant. Rather we think that the 
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5) and the fact that extraordinary data are required; in particular, the time dimension of 
the data should cover both boom and recession. Given that Lecher and Wunsch (2009) 
is the only paper available, we spend some time on their paper.  
Lechner and Wunsch considered training in (West) Germany. The treated population 
may have entered training at some time point between 1986 and 1995. Labor market 
outcomes are observed until 2003. Their analysis is based on a selection-on-observables 
assumption (there is presumably no other alternative). 
They estimate short-run program effects (outcomes observed 6 months after program 
entry) and long-run effects (outcomes observed 8 years after program entry). The short-
run effects primarily capture the lock-in effects of program participation.  
Lechner  and  Wunsch  found  that,  on  average,  program  participation  reduced  the 
employment  probability  by  15  percentage  points  in  the  short  run  and  increased the 
employment probability by 10 percentage points in the long run. Cumulated over the 8 
years that outcomes can be observed (which is arguably the most relevant metric), the 
estimates imply a relative increase in months of employment by 5 percent.  
The main point of the Lechner and Wunsch (2009) paper is, however, to correlate the 
estimated  treatment  effects  with  the  unemployment  rate  at  program  entry.  Table  4 
reproduces their baseline results. 
 
Table 4: Correlations between program effects and unemployment rate at program entry 
Dependent variable: Programs effects (Outcome: employment) 
   
Correlation with unemployment at program entry 
 
 





Long-run effect (8 yrs.) 
 
0.31** 
Note: Based on Lechner & Wunsch (2009), Table 2. * = significant at 5 % level; ** = significant at 1 % 
level 
 
As shown in Table 4, their analysis suggests that when unemployment at the time of 
program entry is high: (i) lock-in effects are less negative; and (ii) long-run effects are 
more positive.   
 
What active labor market policy works best in a recession?  24 
Table 4 reports the baseline results of Lechner and Wunsch (2009). These baseline 
estimates are potentially plagued by (at least) two problems. First, the skill composition 
of program participants changes with the cycle; in Germany, participants tend to be 
more positively selected in a downturn. Second, “training” is a heterogeneous group of 
programs; the composition may change over the cycle as might the planned duration of 
a given program. Lechner and Wunsch found that these two problems raise no concerns. 
The correlations with the unemployment rate at program entry do no change much when 
the characteristics of the participants and the composition of training programs are held 
constant. 
What are the caveats to Lechner and Wunsch (2009)? One obvious caveat is that this 
is only one study of a single program for a single country. Of course, this is too little 
empirical evidence to base definitive conclusions on. Nevertheless, we see no obvious 
reason  for  thinking  that  the  correlation  between  unemployment  and  the  effects  of 
training in Germany should be different from other countries. However, we are reluctant 
to  extrapolate  from  training  to  other forms  of ALMP.  The  best  case  for  expanding 
ALMP is probably labor market training. 
But there are also aspects of the Lechner and Wunsch study that could be improved 
upon.  A  maintained  assumption  in  their  study  is  that  there  are  no  changes  in  the 
institutional set-up for training during 1986–95. But this is argued rather than shown, 
and it is not possible for us to assess whether the assumption is credible. In this respect, 
it would have been preferable to examine if treatment effects vary systematically with 
changes in unemployment within regions over time. The virtue of this approach is that 
one can abstract from institutional changes since they are common across regions (at 
least in centralized systems such as the Nordic ones).  
Another maintained assumption is that there is no (or irrelevant) variation in the 
duration until program start. Programs on average start later in a recession (see the 
evidence in Section 6.3). Because of capacity constraints, there is some “weeding-out” 
of the unemployment pool. This is a concern since duration dependence implies that 
individuals become different even though they were identical to begin with. It should be 
straightforward to adjust for the differences in the duration until program start across the  
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cycle;  after  all  the  duration  until  program  start  is  observed  (see  Fredriksson  and 
Johansson 2008). 
In  principle  one  could  also  raise  concerns  about  the  selection-on-observables 
assumption. This critique, however, seems rather moot since there is no other alternative 
in practice (see Section 5). 
7.2  Other (related) evidence 
Given the lack of directly relevant evidence, it is reasonable to look for other evidence 
that  can  shed  light  on  the  issue.  A  meta-study  by  Kluve  (2010)  indicates  that  the 
average rate of unemployment during the program spell does not interact significantly 
with overall program effectiveness. However, there is a positive interaction with the 
effect of labor market training, suggesting that labor market training is more effective in 
a downturn. Since, a meta-analysis just pools together different estimates from different 
studies it is not possible to adjust for changes in the composition of participants and 
programs over the cycle.  
A  few  papers  correlate  treatment  effects  with  unemployment  at  the  time  of 
measuring  outcomes.  The  paper  by  Raaum  et  al  (2002),  for  instance,  found  worse 
effects  of  labor  market  training  when  unemployment  is  high.  But  this  finding  has 
unclear implications for policy design.  
A relevant issue is whether there are more individuals who would benefit from a 
program in a slump. This relates to the question of heterogeneous treatment effects. But 
there is fairly limited systematic evidence on such heterogeneous effects. A general 
conclusion, however, is that programs do not benefit youths to the same extent as older 
age categories (see Card et al. 2009). Also there is some limited evidence that low-
educated and immigrants have more to gain from training (e.g., de Luna et al. 2008). 
Taken at face value, these two results suggest that the variation in the characteristics of 
program participants that we observe over the cycle in Sweden is not optimal.  
If  the  rate  of  skill  obsolescence  is  higher  in  recession,  there  are  indeed  more 
individuals who benefit from a program in a downturn. On basis of the evidence we 
presented in Section 6.1, there is no such general pattern. 
Finally, another kind of related evidence is presented in Schmieder et al. (2009), 
where it is found that the changes in the generosity of unemployment insurance have  
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very similar effects in boom and recession. This may indicate that we should not expect 
very large differences between locking-in effects in different phases of the cycle.  
8  An application for Sweden 
Here we provide new evidence on the effects of ALMPs over the business cycle. More 
specifically,  we  compare  the  effects  of  a  Swedish  on-the-job  training  scheme 
(arbetspraktik) to the effects of labor market training (LMT) over the cycle. The on-the-
job training scheme, which we will refer to as work practice (WP), has been used fairly 
extensively  in  both  boom  and  recession.  In  our  most  sophisticated  regressions,  we 
identify the effects of the cycle using the variation within local labor markets over time 
and adjust the estimates for differences in the timing of the start of the program. We 
thus address two points of criticism that can be levied on the study by Lechner and 
Wunsch (2009).  
There  are  three  main  reasons  for  comparing  treatment  effects  of  two  programs 
(instead of estimating the treatment effect of one program relative to non-participation). 
First,  we  believe  that  selection  on  observed  characteristics  (or  conditional  indepen-
dence) is a more credible assumption when comparing the two programs. Second, by 
comparing two programs we take account of factors affecting all programs that correlate 
with the regional unemployment rate. Third, the relative comparison answers the highly 
policy relevant question: What kind of program – the on-the-job training scheme or the 
labor market training scheme – is more effective in a downturn?  
We  first  perform  one-to-one  propensity  score  matching  of  treated  (WP)  and 
comparison individuals (LMT) on year of inflow and duration of unemployment spell 
before program entry as well as a battery of covariates.
11 We use individuals aged 25–
55 and consider programs that start within the first year of unemployment.
12 Under 
conditional independence we can use the matched treatment and control group to make 
a  straightforward  comparison  of  the  two  programs.  To  this end  we estimate a  Cox 
                                                
11 The covariates include gender, age, level of education, country of origin, if the unemployed is willing to accept 
part-time  employment,  citizenship,  region  and  previous  unemployment  (number  of  days  and  number  of 
unemployment spells during each of the four years before the start of the unemployment spell.) 
12  We  consider  open  unemployment  and  time  in  any  labor  market  program  as  unemployment.  Temporary 
employment and part-time employment that last more than 30 days are considered as employment.   
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regression model where we allow the treatment effects to vary by time since program 
entry (100 days).
13 Column (1) in Table 5 presents the estimates from this exercise. The 
idea is that any locking-in effects will be occurring mainly during the first 100 days, 
while any post-program effects will mainly occur after the first 100 days. If so, the 
relative size of the locking-in effects will be captured by the estimate of the main effect 
(denoted WP), while the relative size of the post-program effects will be captured by the 
sum of the coefficients on the main effect and the interaction term (WP×T > 100).  
 
Table 5: The efficiency of Work Practice (WP) relative to Labor Market Training 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  General effect  + by cycle  + by year and 
county 
+ by time to 
program start 
+ by individual 
characteristic 
           
WP  0.25**  0.25**  0.18**  0.14**  0.29** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.090) 
WP×T > 100  –0.45**  –0.45**  –0.082  –0.10*  –0.35** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.049)  (0.053)  (0.099) 
WP×(regional u)    –0.015**  –0.0038  –0.029*  –0.030* 
    (0.0042)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
WP×T > 100× 
(regional u) 








           
Observations  163,422  163,422  163,422  163,422  163,422 
Note: The estimates are based on Swedish data during 1999–2005. Regional unemployment is measured 
at the county level and corresponds to the unemployment rate during the month when the program started. 
Regional unemployment rates are deviations from the mean unemployment level during the observation 
period, so that main effects can be interpreted as the mean effect at mean unemployment. Standard errors 
in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Using these two estimates one can also get a sense of the relative size of the total 
effect (the sum of lock-in effects and post-program effects) over some time horizon. The 
two estimates imply that training outperforms work practice in the longer run, because 
the post-program effect will eventually outweigh the estimated lock-in effect. Indeed, 
the survivor functions implied by column (1) suggest that the probability of remaining 
in unemployment is lower for LMT than WP for evaluation horizons that extend beyond 
7 months (218 days) after program entry. This is shown in Figure 7, which plots the 
relative  probability  of  leaving  unemployment  for  employment  (computed  as  the 
difference between the survivor functions for the two programs). Alternatively, one can 
                                                
13 We present Cox regression estimates since they allow us to summarize the relative effects in two coefficients. We 
have also estimated the relative effects on the survival rates. It produces similar patterns.   
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calculate the relative effect on unemployment duration: LMT reduces unemployment 
duration for evaluation horizons beyond 15 months (464 days) after program entry.
14 
The estimates in column (1) correspond well to previous Swedish work on related 
issues. Forslund and Nordström Skans (2006) estimated relative treatment effects of two 
programs  for  young  participants,  and  found  significantly  better  long-run  effects  of 
training  programs  along  a  number  of  labor  market  outcomes.  Arbetsförmedlingen 
(2010a)  presented  estimated  treatment  effects  for  both  programs.  They  found  that 
training had a more favorable effect on the outflow from unemployment to work, over a 
one year horizon. 
 
 
Figure 7: Effect of work practice relative to labor market training on the flow to jobs 
 
Next we examine whether the effects of WP relative LMT depend on the business 
cycle. We thus interact the treatment dummies with regional unemployment (regional u 
                                                
14 The difference in the survival functions integrates to the difference in mean duration. Therefore, WP-participation 
will reduce unemployment  duration relative to  LMT-participation when the two survival functions cross (at 218 
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denotes the regional unemployment rate at the month of program entry) to estimate 
differential relative program effects  over the cycle.
15 Column (2)  presents estimates 
without  any  additional controls.  These  estimates  indicate  that  higher  unemployment 
contributes to a smaller difference in locking-in effects between the programs. The post-
program effect of WP relative to LMT also becomes more negative. All in all, this 
indicates that training is relatively more efficient in recession than in boom. 
Note that even if the matched treatment  and control  group are comparable these 
estimates  may  be  biased.  One  reason  is  that  the  quality  of  programs  may  vary 
systematically with unemployment. Another reason is that the population of eligible 
individuals may differ systematically between regions with high and low unemploy-
ment. We address these issues in two ways. First we introduce regional fixed effects. 
These regional fixed effects take care of any unobserved  differences across  regions 
influencing program effectiveness, provided that these are constant over time. Second, 
we allow the treatment effects to vary by a number of important characteristics like age, 
gender  and  level  of  education.  This  extension  should  further  alleviate  any  problem 
associated with differences in the composition of the pool of unemployed individuals 
across high and low unemployment states. 
This refined analysis is presented in columns (3)–(5). First we add year and region 
fixed effects and allow the general effect to vary by year and region (col. 3); then we 
also add fixed effects by program start dates and allow the treatment effects to vary by 
program start date (col. 4). Finally, we add individual characteristics on top of the other 
covariates, and the treatment effects are again allowed to vary by individual charac-
teristics (col. 5).
16 In our most elaborate model (see col. 5) we believe that it is highly 
unlikely  that  there  are  observed  characteristics  that  may  confound  the  correlation 
between the treatment effects and regional unemployment. 
                                                
15 Regional unemployment is measured at county level (län). It is defined as the number of individuals (aged 25–55) 
in each region registered as openly unemployed or as participants in a labor market program at the employment office 
relative to the total number of individuals (aged 25–55). The former is measured on the 15
th each month and the latter 
is measured once a year using official statistics from Statistics Sweden. Due to its small size we exclude the county of 
Gotland. 
16The  reference  individual  is  a  woman  with  less  than  upper-secondary  education  living  in  Stockholm  in  1999. 
Regional unemployment rates are deviations from the mean, so that main effects can be interpreted as the mean effect 
at mean unemployment for the reference person defined above.  
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Our preferred model is thus the one presented in column (5). According to these 
results, it is still the case that, on average, training outperforms work practice in the 
longer run, despite the fact that the lock-in effect of training is larger than that of work 
practice. Moreover, the lock-in effect of training is smaller in recession, and the post-
program effects also work in favor of training. The estimates in column (5) thus imply 
that training is relatively more efficient in recession than in boom, both because lock-in 
effects  are  less  severe  and  because  post-program  effects  are  more  beneficial  when 
unemployment is high. 
As argued above, it makes intuitive sense that the difference in locking-in effects 
between the programs is smaller in recession (high unemployment), since this is what 
one would expect if one thinks that the return to search is smaller when job-finding rates 
are low. We have no strong prior regarding the post-participation effects. But one may 
note that Lechner and Wunsch (2009) obtained analogous results.  
What magnitudes are implied by the estimates in column (5)? To come up with a 
realistic evaluation point we calculated the difference in unemployment across time 
within region and then took the median of these differences. Over the studied time 
period (1999–2005) a median region experienced a difference between high and low 
unemployment states in the order of two percentage points. Thus we take an increase in 
unemployment by one percentage point to represent a recession, while a decrease of a 
percentage point represents a boom. Figure 8 illustrates the estimates by plotting the 
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Figure 8: Effect of work practice relative to labor market training on the flow to jobs in boom and 
recession 
 
Figure 8 shows that the lock-in effect of training is smaller in recession (the solid line 
is below the dashed line), that “break-even” occurs earlier in recession, and that the 
long-run  treatment  effect  of  training  exceeds  that  of  the  practice  program  more  in 
recession than in boom. Relative to work-practice, training has the long-run effect of 
increasing  the  probability  of  leaving  for  employment  by  4.8  percentage  points  in  a 
recession and 3.1 percentage points in a boom.  
9  Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have considered the case for expanding program activity in a recession. 
We find that there is reasonable case for doing so, which is tied to the varying size of 
the lock-in effect in boom and recession. Thus, if programs with relatively large lock-in 
effects should ever be used they should be used in recession. The reason is simply that 
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The  above  argument  is  primarily  a  case  for  expanding  training  in  a  recession. 
ALMPs  affecting  the  returns  to  search  (JSA  and  monitoring)  should  probably  be 
reduced in recession. 
The empirical evidence is extremely limited. Hitherto, Lechner and Wunsch (2009) 
is the only credible paper on this issue. They find that training appears to be more 
effective  in  a  downturn.  Nevertheless,  this  is  only  one  study  of  a  single  program 
(training) for a single country (Germany).  
To  provide  some  more evidence  we  have  compared  the  effects  of an  on-the-job 
training scheme to labor market training. On average (over the cycle), the on-the-job 
training  scheme  is  associated  with  smaller  (negative)  lock-in  effects  and  smaller 
(positive) long-run effects than labor market training. Our evidence also shows that the 
relative size of the lock-in effect is smaller in recession and that the long-run effects 
become less beneficial in a downturn. This suggests that it is relatively more efficient to 
use the labor market training scheme in recession than in boom.  
In some respects our analysis is an improvement on the analysis by Lechner and 
Wunsch (2009), in others it is not. Despite the differences in the two approaches, our 
results  are  remarkably  consistent  with  those  of  Lechner  and  Wunsch.  Nevertheless, 
more evidence on this issue would be extremely welcome. 
It  is  somewhat  ironic  that  the  clearest  case  for  expanding  program  activity  in 
recession pertains to training. A real problem is that training features relatively large 
fixed costs and capacity constraints. Therefore, the scale of this program is not easily 
adapted to the state of the business cycle.  
Another caveat is that labor market training is likely to be more expensive than the 
on-the-job  training  scheme  ("work  practice").  According  to  Arbetsförmedlingen 
(2010b)  the  direct  cost  per  participant  was  SEK  72,000  in  2008.  Assuming  that 
participants in labor market training (and work practice) would be paid a wage equal the 
wage on the 25
th percentile (SEK 20,900), and adjusting this number to take pay-roll 
taxes into account (pay-roll taxes roughly equal 40 percent) we conclude that labor 
market training would have to prolong employment duration by 2.5 months relative to  
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work practice in order for the benefits to outweigh the costs.
17 This is substantially 
larger  than  the  effects  on  unemployment  duration  that  we  can  observe  during  the 
evaluation window. Our estimates suggest that training reduces (truncated) unemploy-
ment duration over a two-year follow-up horizon by 16.6 days in recession and by 4.4 
days in boom relative to work practice. This rough calculation thus implies that the 
effects of training would have to persist well beyond the evaluation window in order for 
the cost-benefit analysis to come out in favor of training.
18  
It seems to us that program effects in different phases of the cycle would be a very 
fruitful area for further research. Having said this, we are the first to recognize that this 
is a hard evaluation problem. Nevertheless, the prospects for conducting a well designed 
study increases over time along with the build-up of administrative registers covering a 
sufficient time span. 
                                                
17 To be more precise: 72,000/(20900×1.4) » 2.5. 
18 Obviously, there are many caveats to this calculation. Even during the follow-up horizon there are reasons to 
expect that we underestimate the benefits of training. First, we ignore the fact that training may reduce the probability 
of losing the job; the estimates in Forslund and Nordström Skans (2006) suggest that improved employment stability 
relative to the alternative programs that they considered. Second, we assume that participants in training receive the 
same wage upon employment as participants in work practice; if anything we would expect that contribute to higher 
wages relative to work practice.   
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